In a Mar-a-Lago press conference on the morning of Jan. 3, President Trump stated that the United States would “run” Venezuela until a proper transition to a new government can occur. The president’s announcement came in the wake of a lightning U.S. military raid on Caracas, leading to the apprehension on drug-related charges of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. While the military operation unquestionably succeeded in its primary goal, subsequent conflicting signals from Trump and his “war cabinet” about the future of the country raise more questions than provide answers.
It remains unclear how the United States will “run” a sovereign nation of nearly 30 million people, roughly the size of Texas, with no military forces on the ground, let alone a functioning embassy through which to coordinate administration plans to whatever Venezuelan government emerges from the crisis. At the time of this writing (Jan. 5), the country’s Vice President, Delcy Rodriguez, is seemingly in charge, calling for the release of Maduro while cautiously offering to work with Washington to restore order. For the U.S. to “run” the South American nation, Washington will have to completely co-opt Rodriguez, depose her and find a willing puppet figure, or occupy the country to take control of the security apparatus, press and communication facilities, and civil control organizations. Time will tell how the White House proceeds on this issue, but suffice it to say that claiming to “run” another country and actually doing so are birds of an entirely different feather.
Bearing in mind that very few people on either side of the Caribbean are distraught over Maduro’s political demise, Caracas faces an uncertain future with equal parts hope and trepidation. The latter is due to the potential for violence as rival military factions, criminal gangs, and other disaffected groups might attempt to use the current power vacuum to assert their dominance. Absent a clearly-articulated and implemented U.S. plan for the country’s political future, more violence, instability, and refugee flows could be on the horizon for Venezuela.
From the broader perspective of U.S. foreign policy, the recent “snatch and grab” operation sets dangerous precedents for the wider international arena. In the Western Hemisphere, the Caracas blitz should send shivers down the spines of countries across the region, many of which have been heretofore American allies. There are already rumblings within the West Wing that Bogata, Havana, Nuuk, and even Mexico City might be in the White House’s gun sights for purported anti-American policies, involvement in the drug trade, or, as was plausibly the case with Venezuela, access to natural resources. From a military and political perspective, Cuba seems the logical next stop on the administration’s “make Latin America safe for Trumpism” tour.
While the president’s focus on stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States plays well with the base, the fact of the matter is that the Caracas operation was not really about drugs, nor was it related to terrorism. It was primarily about (re)asserting American predominance in its backyard (see the recently-released National Security Strategy). Moreover, it is worth noting that in the fight against the narcotics trade, lacking a commensurate effort focused on the demand side of the drug crisis in America — education, addiction reduction programs, and mental health treatment, an effort exclusively aimed at the supply side will ultimately fail. A truism of capitalism is that supply will always find demand.
Looking further afield, the global ripples of Trump’s Caracas strike will likely lead to a more violent, unstable world. Beijing, Moscow, and the capitals of middling powers (Addis Ababa, Ankara and Riyadh, to name a few) are watching closely and will reasonably view Washington’s neoimperialism in the Caribbean as a green light for their respective revanchist aspirations. Consequently, expect Putin to dig in his heels on the Ukraine crisis, Xi to up the pressure on Taipei, and other would-be regional hegemons to flex their muscles.
The scenario described above could result in a new spheres of influence global paradigm, manifest by expanding Chinese hegemony in East Asia, growing Russian influence in Moscow’s near abroad, and a Trumpian adaptation for the Western Hemisphere (threaten loudly and often and carry a big stick) of Teddy Roosevelt’s “speak softly and carry a big stick” motto from the beginning of the 20th century. Notwithstanding the inherent danger of three aggressive tigers in one global cage, the spheres of influence model would almost certainly lead to nuclear proliferation. Leaders in Warsaw, the Baltic states, Seoul, Tokyo, Bogota, and across the Middle East would have to seriously consider developing a nuclear arsenal as a last resort to protect their national sovereignty. Call this scribe a skeptic, but adding more nuclear powers into an already unsettled geopolitical mix would not bode well for international peace and security.
While Machiavelli is probably smiling in his Florentine grave at our embryonic “might makes right” new world disorder, most of Earth’s current residents will not be so amused by the coming turmoil. Welcome to the troubling realities of the global chessboard in 2026.
Robert Beck of Peterborough served for 30 years overseas with the United States government in embassies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. He now teaches foreign policy classes at Keene State College’s Cheshire Academy for Lifelong Learning.